

“lac” itaque “et melliflui fluctus” non deerunt; si contempseritis, poenarum imminentium seriem divina vox prosecuta est, quippe quod esset dubium id quod erat positum in hominis potestate, parere vel contemnere iussa caelestia. Quod si optionem eorum praecederet decretum inevitabile necessarioque contemnendum esset, abundaret praedictio, abundarent etiam promissa et minae. Est igitur aliquid in hominis potestate nec sunt homines, ita ut a contra sentientibus assereretur, materiae, rerum earum quae aguntur, per quas aguntur sed causa praecedens quam sequitur id quod ex fato est.

Text 1 → 172.—Sed praeter spem aiunt aliquanta provenire.—Scimus, et horum omnium duplex genus: unum eorum quae perraro accidunt, quae vel forte proveniunt vel casu aliquo importantur, ut ex hominibus portenta nasci; alterum quod frequentius quidem provenit sed originem sumit ex humani iudicii depravatione, cum vel a potentibus iratis vel ab inimicis res iudicantur, ut accidit Socrati, eiusdemque populi iudicio cum vir iustissimus condemnatus est Aristides, vel cum prophetae a consceleratis unus membratim sectus, alter obrutus saxis. Numquid etiam horum causa est penes fatum? Nec intellegunt diversas se contrariasque potentias, id est virtutem et item vitia simul, quod fieri non potest,

John Magee's The Master Class on 11th October will compare two extracts from Calcidius' work on the *Timaeus* (Texts 1 and 2). Text 2, (but not Text 1) was taken as a source for the views of the second-century Platonist Numenius by des Places in his 1973 edition of the fragments. There has been a standing debate about how much more Numenius there might be in Calcidius.

your control, and so “milk and rivers of flowing honey” will not be lacking; but if you disobey, then the divine pronouncement has explained in advance the series of imminent punishments—the point being that that which had been placed within human power, the obeying or disobeying of celestial commands, was contingent. But if an “inevitable decree” were to establish in advance the choice between them and the command were to be disobeyed as a matter of *necessity*, then the prediction would be superfluous, as would promises and threats. There is, then, something within human power, and human beings are not, in the manner asserted by those who held the opposite view, the means through which the things that are enacted are enacted, but a preestablished cause which the element extending from fate follows.

172.—But they claim that a certain number of things occur beyond anticipation.—We know, and the class under which they all fall divides in two: one is that of the things that happen very rarely, which either occur fortuitously or are brought about by some element of chance, as in monsters being born from human beings; the other is what occurs with greater frequency but originates in a depravation of human judgment, when matters are judged either by enraged potentates or by one's enemies, as happened to Socrates, or when Aristides, the most just of men, was condemned by a judgment from the same people, or the Prophets, when one was torn limb from limb by wicked men, and another buried under rocks. Is the cause of these too really in the hands of fate? They do not understand that in claiming that crimes of this sort are proper to fate they are assigning diverse and contrary powers, i.e., virtue and vices simultane-

assignare decreto, cum huius modi crimina fati propria esse dicunt. Constituant denique, quid esse fatum velint. Virtutemne divinam? Sed non esset causa malorum. An vero animam malignam? Sed demum a malitia nihil boni fieri potest et fato dicuntur etiam bona provenire. Dicent fortasse mixtam quandam esse substantiam? Et qui fieri potest ut unum et idem quid malitia simul et bonitate sit praeditum intemperantiamque et castitatem creet ceteramque virtutum vitiorumque importet contrarietatem?

173. Quae porro erit de fato existimatio? Quod velit certe omnia esse bona nec tamen possit? Erit igitur imbecillum quiddam et sine viribus. An potest quidem nec tamen vult? Haec vero iam fera est quaedam et immanis invidia. An vero neque vult neque potest? At hoc dicere de fato praesertim flagitiosum. An et potest et vult? Erit ergo causa bonorum omnium, nec malorum auctoritas pertinebit ad fatum.

174. Unde ergo mala? Motum stellarum causantur. Sed ipse motus unde? Et utrum volentibus stellis motus ipse talis fit, ut ex eodem motu et mala proveniant et bona, an invitis? Si volentibus, animalia sunt stellae et iuxta propositum moventur; si invitis, nullus est earum actus. Certe aut omnes stellae divinae sunt et bonae nec quicquam faciunt mali aut quaedam maleficae. Sed maleficas esse in illo sancto et pleno bonitatis loco quatenus convenit, cumque omnia sidera plena sint caelestis sapientiae, malitiam porro sciamus ex

ously, to its decree, which is impossible. Let them determine, finally, what they mean fate to be. A divine power? But it would not be the cause of *evils*. Or if not, then a malign soul? But then no *good* can be wrought by evil, and yet good things too are said to occur in accordance with fate. Perhaps they will claim that it is some kind of blended substance? And yet how is it possible for one and the same thing to be endowed with evil and goodness simultaneously, to breed both intemperance and chasteness and to trigger all manner of contrariety between virtues and vices?

173. And what will their assessment of fate be?—That it surely desires all things to be good but is nevertheless incapable?—Then it will be something ineffective and powerless.—That although capable it nevertheless lacks the desire?—But then this is a wild and brutal ill will of some kind.—That it neither has the desire nor is capable?—But to say this of fate is outrageous in the extreme.—That it both is capable and has the desire?—Then it will be the cause of all *goods*, and the responsibility for evils will have no bearing on fate.

174. What, then, is the origin of evil? They indict stellar movement. But what is the origin of the *movement*? Does the movement proper occur such that, while it remains the same, both goods and evils issue from it, and if so, then with the stars willing it or not willing it? If with them willing it, then the stars are living beings and move according to purpose; if with them not willing it, then theirs is no capacity for action. To be sure, either all stars are divine, good, and productive of no evil or certain ones are maleficent. But given that all heavenly bodies are full of celestial wisdom, and we know that evil arises from mindlessness, to what

dementia nasci, quatenus convenit maleficas stellas esse dicere? Nisi forte, id quod fas non est, interdum easdem bonas interdum malignas esse, existimandum, propterea que promisce beneficia et maleficia praebere. Sed hoc absurdum est, putare caelestem substantiam una eademque natura praeditam non in omnibus stellis eandem esse sed plerasque tamquam a propria degenerare natura.— Sed nimirum hoc invitae stellae patiuntur.— Et quaenam erit illa tanta necessitas quae invitae cogat delinquere? Et haec ipsa utrum divina erit anima an maligna?

175. An vero ratio quaedam est, ut aiunt, qua omnia fiunt quae ad praesens aguntur quaeque futura erunt provenient? Sed nimirum monstri simile est dicere ratione fieri mala quae multo verius dicuntur nulla ratione: iniquus es<se>t vel etiam libidinosus. Series vero illa causarum inevitabilis unde accipiet exordium nisi prius merita nostra in quamcumque partem locentur? Illud vero quis ferre possit quod praeter cetera quae inreligiose dicuntur atque existimantur, providentia quoque dei tollitur hac eorum assertione simulque omnis divinitas exterminatur? Quid enim faciet deus si omnia secundum hanc versutorum hominum affirmationem fient atque impulsu rapido ferantur pro necessitatis instinctu? Facit tamen haec vana praesumptio faciliorem causam nocentibus, quibus licebit non animi sui perversitatem condemnare sed de fatali violentia conqueri, facit bonorum vota iuxta vitam laudabilem et impetus prudentiae pigriores;

extent is it appropriate to speak of the stars—in *that* place, so holy and full of goodness—as being maleficent? Unless perhaps we are to imagine the unspeakable, that the same stars alternate between being good and malign and therefore bestow benefits and harm indiscriminately. But this is absurd, to suppose, not that the celestial substance endowed with one and the same nature is the same in all stars, but that many of them degenerate, as it were, from their proper nature.—But surely the stars endure this against their will?—And what will be that necessity so great as to compel them to do wrong against their will? And this soul itself, will it be divine or malign?

175. Or is there, as they claim, a kind of Reason through which all of the things now being done come about and those yet to be will occur? But surely it borders on monstrosity to say that evils come about through reason when they will far more truly be said to come about through *no* reason: [otherwise, their principle of Reason] would be iniquitous and indeed libidinous. But if our merits are not first posited one way or the other, where will that inevitable series of causes derive its starting point? But quite apart from the other blasphemous claims and opinions, who can endure god's providence too being torn down by this assertion of theirs, and all divinity being exterminated along with it? For what will *god* do if all things are to happen in the way these clever men affirm and things are violently tossed about at the instigation of necessity? Yet this vain presumption eases the case for those who do wrong: the door will be open to their complaining about the violence of fate as opposed to condemning the perversity of their own mind; it thwarts the vows of the good to live a praiseworthy life and

quare missum faciendum est genus hominum ex versutia et vanitate concretum qui, ut ipsi putant, adverso fato nati sunt, quibus haec et talia opinari fato provenerit.

End

176. Nos vero divinam legem sequentes repetemus ab exordio digesto ordine quae de fato Plato veritatis ipsius, ut mihi quidem videtur, instinctu locutus est. Principio cuncta quae sunt et ipsum mundum contineri regique principaliter quidem a summo deo qui est summum bonum ultra omnem substantiam omnemque naturam, aestimatione intellectuque melior, quem cuncta expetunt cum ipse sit plenae perfectionis et nullius societatis indignus, de quo plura dici nunc exorbitare est. Deinde a providentia quae est post illum summum secundae eminentiae quem noyn Graeci vocant; est autem intellegibilis essentia aemula[e] bonitatis propter indefessam ad summum deum conversionem, estque ei ex illo bonitatis haustus quo tam ipsa ornatur quam cetera quae ipso auctore honestantur. Hanc igitur dei voluntatem, tamquam sapientem tutelam rerum omnium, providentiam homines vocant, non, ut plerique aestimant, ideo dictam quia praecurrit in videndo atque intellegendo proventus futuros sed quia proprium divinae mentis intellegere, qui est proprius mentis actus; et est mens dei aeterna; est igitur mens dei intellegendi aeternus actus.

177. Sequitur hanc providentiam fatum, lex divina promulgata intellegentiae sapienti modulamine ad rerum omnium gubernationem. Huic obsequitur ea quae secunda mens dicitur, id est anima mundi tripartita, ut supra

pursue wisdom. And so we must dismiss this class of men so hardened in their clever vanity, who by their own reckoning have been born with fate against them, and who in the end have been fated to hold these and similar opinions.

176. But following the divine law we will repeat from the beginning and in order what Plato at the instigation of truth itself, as it seems to me anyway, said about fate. First, all things that are, including the world itself, are embraced and ruled principally by the Supreme God who is the Supreme Good "beyond all being" and all nature, who is superior to thought and Intellect, whom all things seek because of His being of complete perfection and requiring no fellowship, and about whom to say anything further in the present context would be to digress. Then they are embraced and ruled by the Providence which is second in preeminence to that Supreme God which the Greeks call *Nous*; it is, moreover, intelligible being that emulates Goodness in virtue of its tireless conversion toward the Supreme God, and from the latter it possesses a draft of the Goodness by which it is itself adorned and other things, thanks to His authority, are no less ennobled. And so men refer to this divine Will, this wise guardianship, as it were, of all things, as "Providence" [*foresight*], so called not, as many suppose, because it is a precursor in *seeing* and understanding events to come but because understanding, which is the act *proper* to mind, is a *property* of the divine Mind; and the Mind of God is eternal; hence the Mind of God is the eternal act of understanding.

177. Fate, the divine law promulgated by the wise harmony of intelligence for the governance of all things, follows this Providence. That which is called the Second Mind, i.e., the tripartite World Soul, obeys it, as has been explained

scilicet hoc esse quod silva sit vel etiam qualitatem inseparabilem deum silvae, eundemque per silvam meare velut semen per membra genitalia, et omnium quae nascuntur tam originem quam etiam causam fore, non malorum modo sed turpitudinis quoque et obscenitatis, omniaque agere et pati, vel pudenda. Cuius opinionis deformitas evidentius detegitur exposita Platonis sententia.

Text 2

295. Nunc iam Pythagoricum dogma recenseatur. Numenius ex Pythagorae magisterio Stoicorum hoc de initiis dogma refellens Pythagorae dogmate (cui concinere dicit dogma Platonicum) ait Pythagoram deum quidem singularitatis nomine nominasse, silvam vero duitatis, quam duitatem indeterminatam quidem minime genitam, limitatam vero generatam esse dicere; hoc est antequam exornaretur quidem formamque et ordinem nancisceretur, sine ortu et generatione, exornatam vero atque illustratam a digestore deo esse generatam; atque ita, quia generationis sit fortuna posterior, inornatum illud minime generatum aequaevum deo a quo est ordinatum intellegi debeat, sed non nullos Pythagoreos vim sententiae non recte assecutos putasse dici etiam illam indeterminatam et immensam duitatem, ab unica singularitate institutam recedente a natura sua singularitate et in duitatis habitum migrante. Non recte, ut quae erat singularitas esse desineret, quae non erat duitas subsisteret, atque ex deo silva et ex singularitate immensa et

Text 2 = Numenius fr. 52 (des Places)

impious opinions, namely, that god is the same as matter or indeed an inseparable quality thereof, that he permeates matter as semen does the genital organs, that he is both the origin and cause of *all* things that come to be, evils, turpitude, and obscenity included, and that he performs and undergoes all manner of things, even shameful ones. The deformity of this opinion is the more evidently revealed once Plato's view has been expounded.

295. This is now the point for examination of the Pythagorean doctrine. Numenius, a follower of Pythagoras's teaching, in refuting with Pythagoras's doctrine (with which he says the Platonic one agrees) this Stoic doctrine of principles, says that Pythagoras referred to god by the name "monad" and to matter by "dyad," and that insofar as it is indeterminate this dyad is ungenerated, whereas insofar as it is determinate it is generated. That is, that prior to being adorned by the reception of form and order it was without birth or generation, but that once adorned and illuminated by the god who gave it order it was generated; and that since the circumstance of generation is a later one, the unadorned and ungenerated should thus be considered coeval with the god by whom it was brought into order, but that some Pythagoreans, in misinterpreting what was meant by this view, thought that the indeterminate and immeasurable dyad was intended as well, that it was produced by the solitary monad as the latter receded from its own natural unity and migrated to the state of the dyad. "Misinterpreting," in the sense that the monad that would have ceased to be while the dyad that would have come to be, and there would have been a conversion, matter from god and the immeasurable and indeterminate dyad from the

indeterminata duitas converteretur, quae opinio ne medicriter quidem institutis hominibus competit. Denique Stoicos definitam et limitatam silvam esse natura propria, Pythagoram vero infinitam et sine limite dicere, cumque illi quod natura sit immensum non posse ad modum atque ordinem redigi censeant, Pythagoram solius hanc dei fore virtutem ac potentiam asserere, ut quod natura efficere nequeat, deus facile possit, ut qui sit omni virtute potentior atque praestantior, et a quo natura ipsa vires mutuatur.

296. Igitur Pythagoras quoque, inquit Numenius, fluidam et sine qualitate silvam esse censet nec tamen, ut Stoici, naturae mediae interque bonorum malorumque viciniam, quod genus illi appellant indifferens, sed plane noxiam; deum quippe esse, ut etiam Platoni videtur, initium et causam bonorum, silvam malorum, at vero quod ex specie silvaeque sit, indifferens, non ergo silvam sed mundum ex speciei bonitate silvaeque malitia temperatum; denique ex providentia et necessitate progenitum veterum theologorum scitis haberi.

297. Silvam igitur informem et carentem qualitate tam Stoici quam Pythagoras consentiunt, sed Pythagoras malignam quoque, Stoici nec bonam nec malam. Dehinc tamquam in progressu viae malis aliquot obviis perrogati, unde igitur mala, perversitatem seminarium malorum [fore] causati sunt. Nec expediunt adhuc, unde ipsa perversitas, cum iuxta illos duo sint initia rerum, deus et silva: deus summum

monad—an opinion unsuitable even for men of modest learning. Finally, he says that the Stoics say that matter is defined and limited by its proper nature but that Pythagoras says that it is infinite and limitless, and that, whereas they think that that which is by nature immeasurable cannot be reduced to limit and order, Pythagoras asserts that this is the power and potency that pertains uniquely to god, so that what nature cannot accomplish god can do with ease, being more potent and more excellent than any other power, and the source from which nature acquires its force.

296. Thus Pythagoras too, Numenius says, thinks that matter is fluid and without quality; unlike the Stoics, however, he does not think that it is of a nature intermediate between good and evil, what they call indifferent, but that it is noxious in the full sense of the word. For like Plato, he thinks that god is the source and cause of good, and matter of evil, but that the product of form and matter is indifferent, so that the world, not matter, is a blend of the goodness of form and the maliciousness of matter. Finally, he thinks that according to the pronouncements of the ancient theologians the world is held to be the offspring of providence and necessity.

297. Both the Stoics and Pythagoreans agree, then, that matter is formless and lacks quality, but Pythagoras claims that it is actually evil, and the Stoics that it is neither good nor evil. Consequently, on being asked where, then, the evils originate when a number of them block our progress, as it were, along the way, they pointed to perversity as their root cause. Nor do they go so far as to explain where the perversity originates, since in their view there are two principles of things, God and Matter: God, the highest and preeminent

et praecellens bonum; silva, ut censent, nec bonum nec malum. Sed Pythagoras assistere veritati miris licet et contra opinionem hominum operantibus asseverationibus non veretur, qui ait existente providentia mala quoque necessario substituisse, propterea quod silva sit et eadem sit malitia praedita. Quod si mundus ex silva, certe factus est de existente olim natura maligna, proptereaque Numenius laudat Heraclitum reprehendentem Homerum, qui optaverit interitum ac vastitatem malis vitae, quod non intellegeret mundum sibi deleri placere, siquidem silva, quae malorum fons est, exterminaretur. Platonemque idem Numenius laudat, quod duas mundi animas autemet, unam beneficentissimam malignam alteram (scilicet silvae), quae, licet incondite fluctuet, tamen, quia intimo proprioque motu movetur, vivat et anima convegetetur necesse est, lege eorum omnium quae genuino motu moventur. Quae quidem etiam patibilis animae partis, in qua est aliquid corpulentum mortaleque et corporis simile, auctrix est et patrona, sicut rationabilis animae pars auctore utitur ratione ac deo; porro ex deo et silva factus est iste mundus.

298. Igitur iuxta Platonem mundo bona sua dei tamquam patris liberalitate collata sunt, mala vero matris silvae vitio cohaeserunt. Qua ratione intellegi datur Stoicos frustra causari nescio quam perversitatem, cum quae proveniunt ex motu stellarum provenire dicantur. Stellae porro corpora

good; and Matter, as they reckon, neither a good nor an evil. But Pythagoras does not hesitate to stand by the truth, although with claims that are paradoxical or contrary to human opinion; and he says that since providence exists it was necessary for evil to have come to be as well, given that Matter exists and is endowed with the same principle of evil. But if the world consists of Matter, then it was surely made from a preexisting evil nature, which is why Numenius praises Heraclitus for criticizing Homer, who longed for an end and the wiping out of life's ills, failing to understand that he would actually be arguing for the destruction of the world if Matter, the source of evil, were to be exterminated. And Numenius also praises Plato for insisting on two world souls, one supremely beneficent and the other (namely, the one pertaining to Matter) malign, which despite its disorderly fluctuation nevertheless necessarily is endowed with life and quickened by soul, since it moves according to an internal and intrinsic principle of motion in conformity with the law governing all things that move according to an innate principle of motion. Matter is what gives rise to and oversees the passible part of soul, which is possessed of a corporeal and mortal element similar to body, just as the rational part of soul has reason and God to give rise to it; and the world came to be from God and Matter.

298. According to Plato, then, the world received its proper goods owing to the liberality of God, its father, as it were, whereas its evils adhered to it owing to the defect of Matter, its mother. And from this reasoning it becomes possible to understand the pointlessness of the Stoics' laying the blame on some perversity or other when the things that happen are claimed to do so because of stellar movement.

sunt ignesque caelites; omnium quippe corporum silva nutritrix, ut etiam quae sidereus motus minus utiliter et improspere turbat originem trahere videantur ex silva, in qua est multa intemperies et improvidus impetus et casus atque ut libet exagitata praesumptio. Itaque si deus eam correxit, ut in Timaeo loquitur Plato, redegitque in ordinem ex incondita et turbulenta iactatione, certe confusa haec intemperies eius casu quodam et improspere sorte habebatur nec ex providentiae consultis salubribus. Ergo iuxta Pythagoram silvae anima neque sine ulla est substantia, ut plerique arbitrantur, et adversatur providentiae consulta eius impugnare gestiens malitiae suae viribus. Sed providentia quidem est dei opus et officium, caeca vero fortuitaque temeritas ex prosapia silvae, ut sit evidens iuxta Pythagoram dei silvaeque item providentiae fortunaeque coetu cunctae rei molem esse constructam, sed postquam silvae ornatus accesserit ipsam quidem matrem esse factam corporeorum et nativorum deorum, fortunam vero eius prosperam esse magna ex parte non tamen usque quaque, quoniam naturale vitium limari omnino nequiret.

299. Deus itaque silvam magnifica virtute comebat vitiaque eius omnifariam corrigebat, non interficiens ne natura silvestris funditus interiret nec vero permittens porrigi dilatarique passim sed, ut manente natura quae ex incommodo habitu ad prosperitatem devocari commutarique possit, ordinem inordinatae confusio, modum immoderationi, et

Moreover, the stars are bodies or celestial fires; and matter is the nurse of all bodies, so that those things too which to no apparent purpose or to ill effect are driven by the stars are seen to originate in matter, which is possessed of much intemperance, an improvident drive, the element of chance, and a randomly motivated determination. So if *god* corrected and, as Plato says in the *Timaeus* [30a], *brought it back to order from a confused and turbulent state of agitation*, then surely this its confused intemperance was due to some element of ill-fated chance rather than to the salutary plans of providence. According to Pythagoras, then, soul as it pertains to Matter is not the absence of any being, as many suppose, and it resists providence, struggling through the force of its own malice to impugn its plans. Providence, however, is the work and function of God, whereas blind and fortuitous rashness is the inheritance of Matter, so that according to Pythagoras it is clear that the mass of the universe was constructed through the convergence of God, Matter, providence, and fortune, but that upon receiving order Matter itself became the mother of corporeal and generated gods while the fortune it confers is for the most part prosperous but not entirely so, since the natural defect could not be eliminated altogether.

299. Thus with his magnificent power God set about adorning Matter and correcting its defects in all aspects, neither destroying them to the point of the material nature's entirely perishing nor permitting them to extend and spread everywhere, but on the understanding that there is an enduring nature capable of being recalled and changed from a debased state to one of prosperity, in bringing order to disordered confusion, limit to immoderation, and dignity to

cultum foeditati coniungens totum statum eius illustrando atque exornando convertit. Denique negat inveniri Numenius et recte negat immunem a vitiis usque quaque generatorum fortunam, non in artibus hominum non in natura, non in corporibus animalium nec vero in arboribus aut stirpibus non in frugibus non in aeris serie nec in aquae tractu nec in ipso quidem caelo, ubique miscente se providentiae deterioris naturae quasi quodam piaculo. Idemque, nudam silvae imaginem demonstrare et velut in lucem destituere studens detractis omnibus singillatim corporibus quae gremio eius formas invicem mutantur et invicem mutant, ipsum illud quod ex egestione vacuatum est animo considerari iubet, eamque silvam et necessitatem cognominat, ex qua et deo mundi machinam constituisse deo persuadente, necessitate obsecundante. Haec est Pythagorae de originibus asseveratio.

End

300. Superest ipsa nobis ad tractandum Platonis de silva sententia, quam diverse interpretari videntur auditores Platonis. Quippe alii generatam dici ab eo putaverunt verba quaedam potius quam rem secuti, alii vero sine generatione sed anima praeditam, quando ante illustrationem quoque motu instabili atque inordinato dixerit eam fluctuasse (cum motus intimus genuinusque sit viventium proprius); quoque idem saepe alias duas esse mundi animas dixerit, unam malignam ex silva alteram beneficam ex deo; existentibus itaque bonis ac malis, bona quidem ex anima benefica mundo tributa, incommoda porro ex silvestri maligna; cum divina

depravity he altered its state entirely by illuminating and adorning it. Finally, Numenius rightly points out that the lot of generated things is nowhere found to be immune to defects, whether in the devices of men or in nature: animal bodies, trees, plants, fruits, the broad expanses of air and water, and indeed the heaven itself—everywhere a lower nature is expiating its sin, as it were, by intermingling with providence. And in an effort to display a stripped down image of matter and to expose it, so to speak, to the light after having removed one by one all of the corporeal entities that undergo reciprocal changes of form within its womb, he bids us to contemplate the very thing hollowed out by the abstraction, calls it matter and necessity, and says that it is from it and god that the engine of the world has come to be, through god's persuasion and necessity's compliance. This is Pythagoras's claim concerning the first beginnings.

300. It remains for us to treat of Plato's own opinion concerning matter, which Plato's students evidently interpret in different ways. For some, fixing on certain phrases rather than the substance of what he says, have thought that it is said by him to be generated, while others have thought that it is ungenerated but endowed with soul. And the latter on strength of his claim that even prior to its illumination matter was in a state of flux, its movement being unstable and disorderly (for movement is an intrinsic and innate property of living things); also, on strength of his repeated claim in other works that there are two world souls, a malign one originating in matter and a beneficent one originating in god; and that, given therefore that good and evil things exist, good ones accrue to the world owing to the beneficent soul whereas harmful ones do so owing to the material or

Fr. 52

Commentaire : J. C. M. van Winden, *Calcidius on Matter*, Leyde, 1959, p. 103-121 (avec traduction anglaise); J. H. Waszink, in *Timaeus a Calcidio translatus*, Londres et Leyde, 1962, p. xxxviii-liv et *ad loc.*; id., in *Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique*, Vandœuvres-Genève, XII, 1966, p. 67-77.

CCXCV. Examinons maintenant la doctrine pythagoricienne. Numénius, qui était de l'école de Pythagore, recourt, pour réfuter cette doctrine stoïcienne des principes, à la doctrine de Pythagore, avec laquelle il dit que s'accorde celle de Platon; d'après lui, Pythagore a donné à Dieu le nom de monade, à la matière celui de dyade¹; cette dyade, d'après lui, indéterminée n'a pas de génération mais déterminée est engendrée; en d'autres termes, avant d'être parée et de recevoir forme et ordre elle est sans naissance ni génération, mais parée et embellie par le Dieu démiurge² elle est engendrée, et ainsi, comme la génération est un événement postérieur, cet ensemble sans ordre ni génération doit se comprendre comme aussi ancien que le Dieu qui lui apporte l'ordre³. Mais certains pythagoriciens n'ont pas bien saisi la force de cette théorie; pour eux, cette dyade indéterminée et sans mesure est, elle aussi, produite par l'unique monade, quand cette monade quitte sa nature pour prendre les dehors de la dyade; d'où ce paradoxe que la monade, qui existait, disparaîtrait, que la dyade, inexistante, viendrait à l'être et qu'une transformation ferait de Dieu la matière et de la monade la dyade sans mesure ni limites: opinion inacceptable même pour des gens de faible culture. Enfin, selon les stoïciens, la matière est, de par sa nature propre, déterminée et limitée; selon Pythagore, indéfinie et sans limites; et alors que pour les premiers ce qui par nature est indéterminé ne peut se ramener à une mesure et à un ordre, pour Pythagore Dieu seul peut avoir la force et la puissance de

1. Cf. fr. 11, l. 14-16. Comme Pythagore, « Numénius est franchement dualiste » (A.-J. Festugière, *Révélation*, III, p. 43).

Fr. 52 (Test. 30 L.)

(Calcidius, *In Timaeum*, c. 295-299; p. 297, 7-301, 20 Waszink)

CCXCV. Nunc iam Pythagoricorum dogma recenseatur. Numenius ex Pythagorae magisterio Stoicorum hoc de initiis dogma refellens Pythagorae dogmate, cui concinere dicit dogma platonikum, ait Pythagoram deum quidem singularitatis nomine nominasse, silvam vero duitatis; quam duitatem indeterminatam quidem minime genitam, limitatam vero generatam esse dicere, hoc est, antequam exornaretur quidem formamque et ordinem nancisceretur, sine ortu et generatione, exornatam vero atque illustratam a digestore deo esse generatam, atque ita, quia generationis sit fortuna posterior, inornatum illud minime generatum aequae-vum deo, a quo est ordinatum, intellegi debeat. Sed non nullos Pythagoreos vim sententiae non recte assecutos putasse dici etiam illam indeterminatam et immensam duitatem ab unica singularitate institutam recedente a natura sua singularitate et in duitatis habitum migrante — non recte, ut quae erat singularitas esse desineret, quae non erat duitas subsisteret, atque ex deo silva et ex singularitate immensa et indeterminata duitas converteretur; quae opinio ne mediocriter quidem institutis hominibus competit; denique Stoicos definitam et limitatam silvam esse natura propria, Pythagoram vero infinitam et sine limite dicere, cumque illi quod natura sit immensum non posse ad modum atque ordinem redigi censeant, Pythagoram solius hanc dei fore virtutem ac potentiam asserere, ut

pouvoir facilement ce qui est impossible à la nature, lui qui est plus puissant et plus sublime que toute force, lui à qui la nature même emprunte son pouvoir.

CCXCVI. Donc Pythagore aussi, dit-il, estime la matière fluide⁴ et sans qualité, sans cependant lui attribuer, comme les stoïciens, une nature intermédiaire et, aux confins du bien et du mal, ce qu'ils appellent le genre indifférent; pour lui, elle est franchement malfaisante. Car, pour lui comme pour Platon, Dieu est commencement et cause du bien, la matière l'est du mal; et c'est le composé de forme⁵ et de matière qui est indifférent, non par conséquent la matière, mais le monde, où se mêlent la bonté de la forme et la malfaisance de la matière; finalement, c'est de la providence et de la nécessité⁶ que le fait naître l'enseignement des vieux théologiens⁷.

CCXCVII. Ainsi, que la matière soit sans formeni qualité, les stoïciens s'accordent là-dessus avec Pythagore; mais Pythagore la fait en outre malfaisante, les stoïciens, eux, ni bonne ni mauvaise. Ensuite, comme en cours de route, pour ainsi dire, ils rencontrent le mal et qu'on leur demande: « D'où vient donc le mal? »⁸ ils allèguent quelque perversion qui pourrait en être la cause. Mais ils n'expliquent pas encore d'où provient la perversion elle-même, puisque, selon eux, il y a deux principes des choses, Dieu et la matière, Dieu Bien suprême et suréminent, la matière, d'après eux, ni bonne ni mauvaise. Mais Pythagore ne craint pas de soutenir la vérité même par des affirmations étonnantes et qui vont à l'encontre des opinions communes; selon lui, dès lors qu'il existait une Providence, le mal devait aussi nécessairement subsister, puisqu'il y avait une matière et une matière armée de malfaisance. Que si le monde vient de la matière, il est sûrement né d'une matière autrefois mauvaise, et voilà pourquoi Numénius loue Héraclite

4. Cf. la n. 1 du fr. 4 a (aux Notes complémentaires, p. 105).

5. « Species hic pro deo; secundum Numenium species fere id quod νοῦς, deus vero ὁ πρῶτος νοῦς » (Waszink, *ad loc.*, renvoyant à Proclus, *Tim.*, III, p. 103, 28 D. = notre fr. 22, *test.* 25 L.).

30 quod natura efficere nequeat, deus facile possit, ut qui sit omni virtute potentior atque praestantior, et a quo natura ipsa vires mutuetur.

CCXCVI. Igitur Pythagoras quoque, inquit Numenius, fluidam et sine qualitate silvam esse cen-
35 set nec tamen, ut Stoici, naturae mediae interque bonorum malorumque viciniam, quod genus illi appellant indifferens, sed plane noxiam. Deum quippe esse — ut etiam Platoni videtur — initium et causam bonorum, silvam malorum, at vero quod
40 ex specie silvaeque sit, indifferens, non ergo silvam, sed mundum ex speciei bonitate silvaeque malitia temperatum; denique ex providentia et necessitate progenitum veterum theologorum scitis haberi.

CCXCVII. Silvam igitur informem et carentem
45 qualitate tam Stoici quam Pythagoras consentiunt, sed Pythagoras malignam quoque, Stoici nec bonam nec malam. Dehinc, tanquam in progressu viae malis aliquot obviis, perrogati: « Unde igitur mala? » perversitatem seminarium malorum fore cau-
50 sati sunt. Nec expediunt adhuc, unde ipsa perversitas, cum iuxta illos duo sint initia rerum, deus et silva, deus summum et praecellens bonum, silva, ut censent, nec bonum nec malum. Sed Pythagoras assistere veritati miris licet et contra opinionem ho-
55 minum operantibus asseverationibus non veretur; qui ait existente providentia mala quoque necessario substitisse, propterea quod silva sit et eadem sit malitia praedita. Quod si mundus ex silva, certe factus est de existente olim natura maligna, prop-
60 terea quoque Numenius laudat Heraclitum reprehenden-

48 obviis cj. Leemans: obvias (obviasse, obviantes) codd.

de reprendre Homère⁹ qui avait souhaité aux maux de la vie disparition et ruine, sans comprendre qu'il demandait ainsi la fin du monde, au cas où la matière, qui est la source du mal, serait exterminée. Le même Numénius loue Platon de proclamer deux âmes du monde, l'une extrêmement bienfaisante, l'autre malfaisante¹⁰, c'est-à-dire la matière, qui, malgré son flottement sans ordre et parce qu'elle se meut d'un mouvement intérieur et propre, doit vivre et tenir sa vie d'une âme, comme tout ce qui se meut d'un mouvement naturel¹¹; elle crée et régit aussi la partie passible de l'âme¹² qui a un élément matériel, mortel et corporel, comme la partie raisonnable de l'âme a pour auteurs la raison et Dieu. Or c'est de Dieu et de la matière qu'a été fait le monde sublunaire.

CCXCVIII. Donc, selon Platon, le monde a reçu ses biens de la libéralité de Dieu comme d'un père; les maux, c'est par la faute de sa mère la matière qu'ils se sont attachés à lui¹³. Aussi peut-on comprendre que les Stoïciens invoquent en vain je ne sais quelle perversion¹⁴, quand ils font provenir du mouvement des étoiles les maux qui surviennent. C'est que les étoiles sont des corps et des feux célestes, et les corps ont la matière pour nourrice¹⁵; ainsi, même les perturbations que le mouvement des astres amène pour notre désavantage et notre malheur semblent tenir leur origine de la matière, où se trouve beaucoup d'instabilité, un élan aveugle, le hasard, une présomption qui s'excite arbitrairement. C'est pourquoi, si Dieu l'a redressée, comme Platon s'exprime dans le *Timée*, et d'une agitation désordonnée et tumultueuse l'a ramenée à l'ordre¹⁶, il est évident que cette instabilité confuse de la matière lui venait du hasard, d'un sort malheureux, et non des plans sal-

9. Diels-Kranz (A 22) citent, avec ce « témoignage » de Numénius, Aristote, *Eth. Eud.*, H 1, 1235 a 25, où Héraclite « reproche au poète d'avoir dit » (*Il.*, 18, 107) : « Ah! qu'il périsse donc, chez les dieux comme chez les hommes, cet esprit de querelle... » (trad. P. Mazon). Voir aussi les témoignages réunis et commentés par M. Marcovich, *Heraclitus*, Merida, 1967, p. 132-149, ad fr. 53 et 80 D.-K.

tem Homerum, qui optaverit interitum ac vastitatem malis vitae, quod non intellexeret mundum sibi deleri placere, siquidem silva, quae malorum fons est, exterminaretur. Platonemque idem Numénius laudat, quod duas mundi animas autumet, unam beneficentissimam, malignam alteram, scilicet silvam, quae, licet incondite fluctuet, tamen, quia intimo proprioque motu movetur, vivat et anima convegetetur necesse est lege eorum omnium quae genuino motu moventur; quae quidem etiam patibilis animae partis, in qua est aliquid corpulentum mortaleque et corporis simile, auctrix est et patrona, sicut rationabilis animae pars auctore utitur ratione ac deo. Porro ex deo et silva factus est iste mundus.

CCXCVIII. Igitur iuxta Platonem mundo bona sua dei tanquam patris liberalitate collata sunt, mala vero matris silvae vitio cohaeserunt. Qua ratione intellegi datur Stoicos frustra causari nescio quam perversitatem, cum quae proveniunt ex motu stellarum provenire dicant. Stellae porro corpora sunt ignesque caelites; omnium quippe corporum silva nutrix, ut etiam quae sidereus motus minus utiliter et improspere turbat originem trahere videantur ex silva, in qua est multa intemperies et improvidus impetus et casus atque ut libet exagitata praesumptio. Itaque si deus eam correxit, ut in *Timaeo* loquitur Plato, redegitque in ordinem ex incondita et turbulenta iactatione, certe confusa haec intemperies eius casu quodam et improspere sorte habebatur nec ex providentiae consultis salu-

67 silvam] silvae cj. Theiler || 81 dicant cj. Waszink : dicuntur (dicantur) codd.

vifiques de la Providence. Ainsi donc, selon Pythagore, l'âme de la matière n'est pas sans quelque substance, comme le croient la plupart¹⁷, mais elle s'oppose à la Providence en s'efforçant d'attaquer ses plans par la force de sa malfaisance¹⁸; si la Providence est l'œuvre et l'activité de Dieu, la témérité aveugle et fortuite vient de la souche de la matière; d'où il appert, selon Pythagore, que la masse de toute chose est faite de cette rencontre de la Providence et du hasard¹⁹; mais quand la matière a eu reçu sa parure, elle est devenue la mère des dieux corporels et engendrés²⁰, et son sort est heureux en grande partie, non cependant totalement, parce que son vice originel ne pouvait être entièrement éliminé.

CCXCIX. Voilà pourquoi Dieu embellissait la matière par sa puissance magnifique et de toute manière en corrigeait les défauts, sans les tuer²¹, de peur que cette nature matérielle ne périclît de fond en comble, sans non plus la laisser s'étendre et se dilater en tous sens; mais en faisant subsister sa nature, qui pouvait d'une situation disgraciée être amenée à la prospérité et transformée, il y unit l'ordre à une confusion désordonnée, la mesure à l'excès et la beauté à la laideur, et changea tout son état en l'éclairant et en l'ornant. Enfin Numénius prétend, et sa prétention est fondée, qu'on ne trouve pas dans la génération un sort entièrement exempt de défauts, que ce soit dans les arts humains, ou dans la nature, ou dans les corps des animaux, ou encore dans les arbres ou les plantes, ou dans les fruits, que ce soit au fil de l'air ou au courant de l'eau, pas même dans le ciel, vu que partout il se mêle à la Providence comme la souillure d'une nature inférieure²². Le même Numénius, dans son souci de représenter nue l'image de la matière et de la produire à la lumière en soustrayant

19. Cf. p. 124, n. 6.

20. Ce sont les étoiles et les planètes; cf. *Tim.*, 40 d 5, θεῶν ὄρατῶν καὶ γεννητῶν.

21. Cf. c. 297 (ci-avant, l. 60-62, contre le vœu d'Homère).

22. Ces lignes ne font que développer le fr. 50; cf. J. H. Waszink à Calcidius, 301, 10-13 (déjà cité p. 33, n. 3).

bribus. Ergo iuxta Pythagoram silvae anima neque sine ulla est substantia, ut plerique arbitrantur, et adversatur providentiae consulta eius impugnare
 95 gestiens malitiae suae viribus; sed providentia quidem est dei opus et officium, caeca vero fortuitaque temeritas ex prosapia silvae, ut sit evidens iuxta Pythagoram dei silvaeque, item providentiae fortunaeque coetu cunctae rei molem esse cons-
 100 tructam, sed postquam silvae ornatus accesserit, ipsam quidem matrem esse factam corporeorum et nativorum deorum, fortunam vero eius prosperam esse magna ex parte, non tamen usquequaque, quoniam naturale vitium limari omnino nequiret.

105 CCXCIX. Deus itaque silvam magnifica virtute combat vitiaque eius omnifariam corripbat non interficiens, ne natura silvestris funditus interiret, nec vero permittens porrigi dilatarique passim; sed ut manente natura, quae ex incommodo habitu
 110 ad prosperitatem devocari commutarique possit, ordinem inordinatae confusioni, modum immoderationi et cultum foeditati coniungens totum statum eius illustrando atque exornando convertit. Denique negat inveniri Numenius — et recte negat — im-
 115 munem a vitiis usquequaque generatorum fortunam, non in artibus hominum, non in natura, non in corporibus animalium, nec vero in arboribus aut stirpibus, non in frugibus, non in aeris serie nec in aquae tractu, nec in ipso quidem caelo, ubique
 120 miscente se providentiae deterioris naturae quasi quodam piaculo. Idemque nudam silvae imaginem demonstrare et velut in lucem destituere studens

104 limari] eliminari cj. Thedinga.

un à un tous les corps qui par une action réciproque empruntent à son sein leurs formes et les échangent entre eux, veut que l'on considère mentalement le résidu laissé par ces retranchements et le nomme matière et nécessité²³; de cette matière et de Dieu il compose la structure du monde, par la force persuasive du Dieu et l'obéissance de la nécessité²⁴. Telle est la doctrine de Pythagore sur les origines.

Fr. 53 (33 L.)

Commentaire : H. Chadwick, *Origen* : « *Contra Celsum* », Cambridge, 1953, p. 295 (avec traduction anglaise); traduction française de M. Borret, *S. C.*, 147, p. 117 (en partie reproduite ici).

De Sérapis il existe une histoire longue et incohérente. Ce n'est que tout récemment qu'il est venu au jour par certains sortilèges de Ptolémée¹, désireux de le présenter comme un dieu visible aux habitants d'Alexandrie. J'ai lu chez le Pythagoricien Numénius, à propos de sa formation², comment, selon cet auteur, le dieu participe à l'essence de tous les animaux et végétaux³ régis par la nature; il paraît ainsi avoir été constitué dieu, grâce aux rites impies⁴ et aux sortilèges qui évoquent les démons, non seulement par les statuaires mais encore par les magiciens, les sorciers et les démons qu'évoquent leurs charmes.

Fr. 54 (38 L.)

On appelle Apollon « Delphien » parce qu'il montre en pleine lumière ce qui est obscur (de « faire voir l'in-

24. Opposition de *πειθώ* et *δανάγκη*: *Timée*, 48 a 1-4, 56 a 5-6 (cf. p. 124, n. 6); *Lois*, IV, 722 c 1, et ma note *ad loc.*

1. Ptolémée I Soter (c. 367-283 a. C.); cf. Tacite, *Histoires*, IV, 81, 2, et 84, 7; Plutarque, *Isis et Osiris*, 28, 361 f sv.; et voir P. Jouguet, « Les premiers Ptolémées et l'hellénisation de Sarapis », in *Hommages à J. Bidez et à F. Cumont*, Bruxelles [1949], p. 159-166.

detractis omnibus singillatim corporibus, quae gremio eius formas invicem mutantur et invicem mutant, ipsum illud quod ex egestione vacuatum est animo considerari iubet, eamque silvam et necessitatem cognominat; ex qua et deo mundi machinam constituisse deo persuadente, necessitate obsecundante. Haec est Pythagorae de originibus asse-

130 veratio.

Fr. 53 (33 L.)

(Origenes, *Contra Celsum*, V, 38; II, p. 42, 23-43, 3 Koetschau; III, p. 116, 29-38 Borret)

Περὶ δὲ Σαράπιδος πολλὴ καὶ διάφανος ἱστορία, χθὲς καὶ πρῶν εἰς μέσον ἔλθόντος κατὰ τινὰς μαγγανείας τοῦ βουλευθέντος Πτολεμαίου οἰοῦναι ἐπιφανῆ δεῖξαι τοῖς ἐν Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ θεόν. Ἀνεγνωμεν δὲ παρὰ Νουμηνίου
5 τῷ Πυθαγορείῳ περὶ τῆς κατασκευῆς αὐτοῦ, ὡς ἄρα πάντων τῶν ὑπὸ φύσεως διοικουμένων μετέχει οὐσίας ζῶων καὶ φυτῶν ἵνα δόξη μετὰ τῶν ἀτελέστων τελετῶν καὶ τῶν καλουσῶν δαίμονας μαγγανειῶν οὐχ ὑπὸ ἀγαματοποιῶν μόνων κατασκευάζεσθαι θεὸς ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὸ
10 μάγων καὶ φαρμακῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπωδαῖς αὐτῶν κηλουμένων δαιμόνων.

A (Vatic. gr. 386, s. XIII).

7 ζῶων A : λίθων cj. Leemans || 10 αὐτῶν edd. : αὐταῖς A.

Fr. 54 (38 L.)

(Macrobius, *Saturn.*, I, 17, 65; p. 99, 12-16 Willis)

Ἀπόλλωνα Δέλφιον vocant, quod quae obscura sunt claritudine lucis ostendit ἐκ τοῦ δηλοῦν τὰ ἀφανῆ αὐτ,